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ABSTRACT 
 
During the presidential campaign of 2016, Donald Trump 
successfully marshaled years of repressed popular anger over job 
losses and the erosion of the middle class, caused in part by a 
globalizing economy and the movement of the American 
manufacturing base to other parts of the world. Although a 
great deal of job loss in the American “heartland” was caused by 
automation, there is little doubt that many factories were closed 
and moved abroad with no regard for the devastated middle-
class workers left behind. This outsourcing of the American 
workforce was the result of free trade laws devised in the 1990s, 
resistance to which mainstream politicians and scholars had 
largely failed to take seriously. Trump articulated and 
channeled this populist anger, while ignoring the opportunistic 
role played by American corporations in taking advantage of free 
trade rules to move their operations abroad in pursuit of greater 
profitability. Trump also distorted public understanding of the 
problem by emphasizing the idea that other countries had 
“taken advantage of” and “ripped off” the United States. In this, 
he relied on an untapped well of resentment among American 
workers, seducing voters with the promise that he could 
renegotiate these deals and restore a lost economic world in 
which they had felt more secure. 
This article argues that global free trade and the laws that 
support it have complex purposes, and mixed economic effects. 
While job losses have occurred, globalization has also brought 
about benefits in terms of peace and international 
understanding. This article also explores the important legal 
question of whether and how one president is capable of 
bringing down the entire world trading system, built up over 
several decades. In addition, the reasons behind the obvious 
failure of trade law specialists to confront the contradictions 
posed by free trade doctrine, and the extent to which they failed 
to prescribe remedies for its adverse fallout are also analyzed in 
depth. Finally, this article suggests possible remedies to protect 
American workers against the ill effects of labor outsourcing, but 
notes that few if any American politicians have seriously 
pursued such remedies, for instance by drafting statutes to that 
end. Empowering workers in corporate decision making and 
imposing serious penalties on corporations when jobs are lost 
through outsourcing are methods that have scarcely been tried.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2016 presidential campaign in the United States 
upended decades of mainstream rhetoric on the subject of free 
trade and international trade agreements. Long regarded as 
both inevitable and benign by most scholars and commentators, 
the Trump campaign came out swinging against what it called 
“bad trade deals,” and threatened to pull the United States out 
of major trade commitments made over the past fifty years. This 
Article presents the view that Trump was able to capitalize on 
scholarly and political neglect of the issue of free trade and job 
loss over many years, while claiming to be the savior of the 
American worker from the ravages of the free trade consensus. 
There has long been valid concern over the implications for labor 
rights in the United States and elsewhere, as free trade 
agreements inevitably pitted American workers against much 
lower cost workers in countries such as China, a competition 
made possible by the fact that goods that can flow freely around 
the world can also be manufactured virtually anywhere as well. 
This Article explores the manner in which Trump seized 
upon a neglected issue—the quiet rage of workers in the 
American heartland because of factory closures over many 
years—and manipulatively turned this into a problem of “bad 
deals for America” with foreign governments. In his 
presentation, bad foreign actors were the problem, and he alone 
would know how to confront these wily governments. As the 
Article explains, the major free trade agreements of our day are 
based on a set of broad principles believed to lead to peace and 
prosperity through economic integration. While free trade has 
undoubtedly not led to prosperity for all, it is certainly the case 
that global peace and stability rely in part on the predictability 
global trade law helps to create. 
The Article explores the manner in which Trump provided 
a false analysis to a real problem, and it suggests the kind of 
labor-protective solution that could preserve our post-World War 
II ethos of free and fair trade, while responding to the legitimate 
pain and anger at trade-induced job loss and inequality. This 
Article also analyzes what one President has the power to do in 
terms of removing the United States from the world trading 
order, and where those powers must give way to Congress. The 
Article provides useful perspective as stakeholders in the United 
States grapple with the implications of Trump’s threats against 
a free trade system that, while problematic from the point of 
view of many workers, can only be torn down at the cost of much 
chaos and upheaval worldwide. 
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Section I of this Article looks at the manner in which 
Trump framed the free trade problem for American voters, and 
it compares this to how global trade rules really operate. Section 
II explores the increasingly strident role of populists on the 
world stage, and how their promises, if able to be tested, are 
unlikely to prove effective against the problems of 
unemployment, underemployment and social dislocation. 
Section III describes the author’s long-standing sense that 
experts in the trade law field were ignoring the job loss and 
dislocation phenomena at the nation’s peril, and it explores how 
the newly enforceable trade laws of the 1990s guaranteed a 
backlash against the effects of those laws over time. Section IV 
explains advice the author tried to convey to the Clinton 
campaign, to encourage them to seize and repackage the trade 
and job loss issue. The section suggests statutory remedies for 
the outsourcing problem that would be far more effective than 
anything advocated by Trump, either before or after the election. 
Section V looks more broadly at the theoretical basis for free 
trade, and how this theoretical justification tends to break down 
in the practical economic realm.  The argument is presented 
that, despite flaws in economic effects, the trade regime ushered 
in by the World Trade Organization in 1995 is an important 
pillar of world stability and a model for enforceable 
international law. Section VI goes on to inquire into what trade 
laws Trump could actually destroy, and to what extent he is 
willing or capable of pulling down a trade regime that has been 
decades in the making. It may be, as this Article points out, that 
his ambitions will prove far more modest than his rhetoric on 
the campaign trail. In this regard, the final section, Section VII, 
explores what Trump is specifically proposing to date in terms of 
alteration to existing free trade agreements.  
 
II. INTRODUCTION:  COULD ONE PRESIDENT ACTUALLY 
OVERTURN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM?  
 
As of this writing, Donald Trump has revived the one 
issue that worked best for him during the long campaign of 
2015-2016:  “fixing” America’s trade deals. 1  This inartfully 
expressed ambition seemed to go quiet to some extent after the 
                                                          
1  See Chris Riotta, Trump Warns of Ending Global Trade Deals Minutes 
Before Taking Off for Second World Trip, NEWSWEEK (July 5, 2017, 9:55 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-tweets-world-trade-deals-g20-
summit-germany-what-will-happen-632000 (noting that Trump tweeted “The 
United States made some of the worst Trade Deals in world history. Why 
should we continue these deals with countries that do not help us?”).  
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election, but he has reprised the anti-trade rhetoric in recent 
months, renewing calls to get out of “disastrous” trade deals that 
have supposedly allowed the US to be taken advantage of by 
“countries that do not help us,” whatever that might mean at 
any given time.2 
Of course, the post-World War II trading system is based 
on regional and global trade agreements in addition to 
particular and specific bilateral ones, but the broad outlines of 
international trade are based on common and well-established 
global rules. 3  Global trade agreements operate more like a 
general playbook than detailed contracts; they represent 
voluntarily accepted commitments on the part of participating 
countries (which is more or less everyone) and are meant to 
achieve a certain vision of the world as integrated, with a 
complex, interconnected set of economic benefits and, in one 
sense, mutual dependencies.4 Specific issues are often dealt with 
under the negotiating umbrellas provided by these larger 
agreements, but the agreements themselves cannot accurately 
be described as “deals” in the true sense. The goals of modern 
trade agreements are consciously both economic and political.5 
As will be discussed below, the then new and more 
comprehensive (as well as enforceable) trade agreements of the 
1990s had dramatic effects within wealthy, developed countries, 
and in newly industrialized countries.6 It is fairly obvious that 
                                                          
2 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jul. 5, 2017, 4:14 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/882558219285131265?lang=en; see also 
Vicki Needham, Trump Says He Will Renegotiate or Withdraw From NAFTA, 
THE HILL (June 28, 2016, 2:53 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/285189-
trump-says-he-will-renegotiate-or-withdraw-from-nafta-without-changes 
(describing Trump’s declaration that NAFTA has been disastrous for America 
and that he would promptly fix it or leave it if elected president);.  
3 See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 421, 425-35 (1998) (setting out the basic structures of the multilateral 
GATT system, which developed into the WTO).  While all multilateral and 
regional trade agreements have country-specific and bilateral aspects, the 
animating concept is found in a set of common principles and goals. 
4 See Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global 
Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT’L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 209, 213-40 (2011) 
(describing the development of international trade law from a narrower 
concern with tariff reduction through to a far broader role in global 
governance).  
5 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 544-49 (2000) (setting out a grand theory of how the 
WTO’s goals can be seen as transcendently “constitutional”).  
6 See Lori Wallach, Questions the Democratic Presidential Candidates Need to 
Answer on Trade & Globalization, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/questions-the-democratic-
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with greater mobility of manufacturing, large corporations 
would follow cheap labor in the knowledge that the goods 
produced could flow freely and without impediment. 7  The 
American worker, qua American worker, became less valuable 
under such a scenario. This is not a polemical statement, but 
rather a logical fact. The more choices corporations have in 
terms of global labor pools, the less any one such pool of workers 
can demand of corporations.8  
To an extraordinary degree, mainstream American 
politics ignored this reality, and ignored the anger and 
resentment of those whose communities, identities and ways of 
life were subverted by global economic changes.9 While displaced 
workers could be told that they would ultimately have better 
jobs and higher skills as a result of free trade, or that they were 
being displaced by automation every bit as much as by 
globalization, the subterranean unhappiness at this state of 
affairs created the potential for explosive political capture.10 At 
least part of the Trump phenomenon was directly linked to this 
overlooked reality.11 
                                                                                                                                                
_b_88040.html (last updated May 25, 2011), (stating that Democratic 
presidential candidates should address the problem of how trade agreements 
incentivize the offshoring of American jobs).   
7  See generally JEFF FAUX, THE GLOBAL CLASS WAR:  HOW AMERICA’S 
BIPARTISAN ELITE LOST OUR FUTURE- AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN IT 
BACK 59 (2006) (explaining NAFTA created to give corporate investors access 
to cheap labor in Mexico).  
8 See Katherine Peralta, Outsourcing to China Cost U.S. 3.2 Million Jobs 
Since 2001, US NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014, 4:57 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/12/11/outsourcing-to-
china-cost-us-32-million-jobs-since-2001 (noting that recent research supports 
the perception that wage competition and other “bottom line” issues caused 
US manufacturers to move to China in large numbers from the time of 
China’s accession to the WTO).  
9 See Tom Hamburger, Carol D. Leonnig & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama’s 
Record on Outsourcing Draws Criticism From the Left, WASH. POST (July 9, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obamas-record-on-
outsourcing-draws-criticism-from-the-
left/2012/07/09/gJQAljJCZW_story.html?utm_term=.b97f2a4fa260 (noting 
that President Obama was widely perceived not to have lived up to promises 
that he would stem the flow of jobs out of the United States). 
10 See Pankaj Ghemawat, People Are Angry About Globalization. Here’s What 
to Do About It, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/people-
are-angry-about-globalization-heres-what-to-do-about-it (arguing for higher 
levels of information being presented to the general public on this topic).  
11  See Beverly Gage, Who Is the Forgotten Man?, N.Y. TIMES:  WHAT 
HAPPENED ON ELECTION DAY (Nov. 9, 2016),  
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election-night-2016 
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The Trump campaign’s best and most attention-getting 
issue was the anti-free trade position taken by the candidate. 
This was successful because Trump seemed to be saying what 
almost no one else across the political spectrum would say:  That 
free trade had harmed large swaths of American workers in a 
profound way, and that free trade rules needed to be changed. 
(Bernie Sanders, of course, also made a similar argument with 
substantial success.) 
The subject of this article, though, is the manner in which 
Trump employed his anti-trade-deal argument in a twisted 
manner, making it seem as if other countries had tricked and 
out-negotiated the United States—whereas the real story is two-
fold:  The way large US corporations betrayed American workers 
through outsourcing production to locations abroad; and the fact 
that no US labor or tax laws protected American workers 
against this phenomenon. Trump used the understandable 
resentment and mistrust of US workers in affected areas, but 
turned it to his special advantage by aiming his wrath at foreign 
governments. 12  He also ignored the central role of US 
corporations, who relentlessly used the free trade agreements of 
the 1990s to search the world for cheaper and less regulated 
jurisdictions in which to make their products, while still 
maintaining full access to the American consumer market.  
Thus, Trump was able to take advantage of untapped 
rage and confusion (how could our government let this happen to 
our way of life and former prosperity?), while shielding from 
blame the corporate class of which he is himself a charter 
member. It was also easier and more convenient to blame 
foreign “deal makers,” setting himself up as the only possible 
savior, a perception assisted by his tabloid reputation as a 
supposed deal maker extraordinaire.13  
                                                                                                                                                
(attributing Trump’s victory to his advocacy on behalf of the “forgotten” 
working-class white man). 
12 These foreign governments are supposedly better able to make good “deals” 
on behalf of their people. 
13  See Heather Digby Parton, Donald Trump’s Myth is Coming Unglued, 
SALON (June 29, 2017), http://www.salon.com/2017/06/29/donald-trumps-
myth-is-coming-unglued-how-did-the-supposed-master-dealmaker-become-a-
spectacularly-incompetent-president/ (observing distinction between Trump’s 
media persona and his effectiveness as a president); Chris Cillizza, Donald 
Trump Played a Game of Chicken with House Republicans, WASH. POST (Mar. 
24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/03/24/donald-trump-played-a-game-of-chicken-with-house-
republicans-then-he-blinked/?utm_term=.c34c11f1a63b (reporting on failure 
of Congress to pass healthcare reform bill, even though Trump campaigned 
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While acknowledging the depth of worker resentment 
over this state of affairs, and noting my former attempts to point 
out this unaddressed problem, there is danger in the Trump 
approach that shifts blame where it does not belong, and 
threatens to undermine the political dimension of global free 
trade, which is of course international peace and cooperation. At 
a more practical level, it is completely undetermined at the time 
of this writing how far Trump will try to go in fulfilling his 
campaign’s trade-related promises, and what he could actually 
accomplish if he decided to carry through on these. 14  What 
follows is both an explanation, as well as some speculation, on 
where we are and where we are likely to go, legally and 
politically, on the fraught subject of global free trade agreements 
and their effects within the United Sates. 
 
III. FALSE SAVIORS: TRADE, JOB LOSS AND NEO-POPULISTS 
 
Conventional wisdom is that “populism” is on the rise 
worldwide. While rarely explained adequately, the term refers to 
a political technique that relies on stirring up popular feelings of 
nationalism, cultural self-regard and resentment against 
indifferent “elites” or other outsiders.15 Generally speaking, a 
populist will celebrate the “common man” and assure him that, 
though others have ignored his needs, the populist leader will 
protect the interests of the “real” people.16 The populist tends to 
                                                                                                                                                
as a “dealmaker extraordinaire” that could solve the county’s major 
problems).  
14 See Michael Birnbaum & Damian Paletta, At G-20, World Aligns Against 
Trump Policies, WASH. POST (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/at-g-20-eu-warns-of-trade-war-if-
trump-imposes-restrictions-on-steel/2017/07/07/0ffae390-62f4-11e7-a6c7-
f769fa1d5691_story.html?utm_term=.e35111ff525b (reporting Trump has 
revived a threat to place high tariffs on foreign steel). EU leaders attending 
the G20 summit in Germany in July 2017 stated that there would be clear 
and immediate retaliation if Trump imposes new restrictions on steel 
imports. See id. 
15  See The Economist Explains: What Is Populism?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 19, 
2016), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2016/12/economist-explains-18 (explaining that populism can take 
many ideological forms, and citing to the theory that “populists are defined by 
their claim that they alone represent the people, and that all others are 
illegitimate.”). 
16  See Uri Friedman, What Is a Populist? And Is Donald Trump One, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populist-
trump/516525/ (noting that populists divide society into two camps:  the 
16:2  SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW   10 
traffic in the more emotional side of politics, leaving the 
measured logic of the Enlightenment to others. 17  Grand 
promises are made by populists, the people are told that their 
time is now, and that everything that has befallen them is 
someone else’s fault—and that that group of “others” will 
henceforth be identified as the common enemy of both the people 
and the populist.18  To make sure that logic and facts do not 
undermine this vision, the media is thrown in as an enemy of 
the people as well.  
However widely used in recent times, the term “populism” 
does not fully capture the salient themes and techniques of 
contemporary global politics. One unmistakable trend has been 
for far-right political figures to seize on international trade 
agreements as contrary to the interests of the traditional 
working class, on the grounds that bad “deals” rob these people 
of job security and a reliable economic role in the life of the 
nation.19 Both Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen have taken 
this line of attack in recent months. Under this theory, the 
“global elites” have gone about the business of betrayal, working 
in concert to profiteer from the misery of the honest working 
men and women, plotting in the shadows to rob them of their 
economic and social birthright. This political trend has taken 
different forms in different parts of the world, but in each case, 
the message is one of nostalgia for an older, more localized 
economy, for an order that was smashed apart by the wiles and 
guiles of “free trade.”20 
                                                                                                                                                
genuine “people” and all the others, with the populist’s role to divide people 
into these two groups). 
17 See J. Eric Oliver & Wendy M. Rahn, Rise of the Trumpenvolk:  Populism 
in the 2016 Election, 667 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 189, 189-91 
(Sept. 2016) (noting that “populists often employ a distinctive style, one that 
is simple, direct, emotional and frequently indelicate.”).  
18  See Michael Ure, Trump’s Gothic Populism, Comparing Trump’s 
Inauguration Speech to Obama’s, PUB. SEMINAR, (Feb. 15, 2017), 
http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/02/trumps-gothic-
populism/#.WVUSx4TyuUk (explaining how the Obama inauguration speech 
was based squarely on the Enlightenment and Republican ideals of the 18th 
century United States; as compared with Trump’s dark and anti-democratic 
vision, according to which he would be “the voice” of a people under imminent 
threat).  
19  See Shawn Donnan, Free Trade v Populism:  The Fight for America’s 
Economy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9f558874-
7fe2-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4 (describing the arguments being made by anti-
trade, anti-globalist politicians). 
20  The recent election in France featured a large dose of economic and 
cultural nostalgia. See France Election:  Far-right’s Le Pen Rails Against 
Globalisation, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
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There is more than a little truth in the idea that global 
forces have been indifferent to the severe economic dislocation 
felt by the working classes in many countries, especially those 
clustered in the manufacturing heartlands.21 However, the neo-
populist purveyors of this theory have not, whether intentionally 
or not, correctly presented the main players behind this 
economic betrayal. Today’s populists have mainly pointed to 
immigrants and foreigners as the culprits and targets of their 
ire. In addition, foreign governments have been portrayed as 
coldly determined to undermine the well-being of the virtuous 
“folk” in the heartland of the populist’s nation. The populist is 
able to rely on such arguments because over the past several 
decades the increasingly apparent consequences of free trade 
were never explained to “the people”—certainly not by the 
specialists in the best position to do so over since the 1990s.  
It is, as mentioned above, of crucial importance to 
understand that it was large corporations that took advantage of 
enhanced “free trade in goods” rules to move abroad in search of 
cheap labor and other cost savings.22  The kind of relentless free 
trade that was pushed by politicians of all stripes from the late 
1980s onward was primarily about mobility of manufacturing. It 
had little if anything to do with the 18th century doctrine of 
“comparative advantage”, whereby each country should produce 
that which it could make most efficiently and well, in order to 
market that product to the rest of the world.23  Second, instead 
                                                                                                                                                
europe-38872335 (describing Le Pen’s interpretation of globalization as 
“manufacturing by slaves for selling to the unemployed,” and offering a 
solution that is “guided by intelligent protectionism and economic 
patriotism.”). 
21 Many commentators over the past 20-30 years have described in detail the 
way global economic elites have captured the rhetoric of free trade in order to 
enrich themselves to the detriment of the middle classes. See FAUX, supra 
note 7 (providing a ten-year retrospective analysis on NAFTA). A classic work 
of this kind, Faux explains that “NAFTA, the prototype international 
agreement for the dismantling of public regulation over business, was not 
thrust upon the governing class of the United States, Mexico or Canada. It 
was created by them.”  See id. at 31. 
22 See generally FAUX, supra note 7.  
23  See Sara Dillon, Opportunism and Trade Law Revisited: The Pseudo-
Constitution of the WTO, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1005, 1024-29 (2013) [hereinafter 
Opportunism Revisited] (criticizing the doctrine of comparative advantage, 
and its inadequacy to confront the problem of mass outsourcing). Previously, 
I argued that for modern trade agreements, “the intellectual basis for the 
trade rules in a ‘comparative advantage’ doctrine was flimsy, the likely 
outcome for certain labor interests plain to see, and yet what was glaringly 
important …was completely ignored by most ‘specialists’ in the field.” Id. at 
1010. 
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of calling for increased worker rights and demanding effective 
incentives for US and European manufacturers to remain in 
their home countries, neo-populists are instead using this crisis 
of confidence to peddle policies that will likely render the lives of 
the affected workers even more disadvantaged.24 In that sense, 
cynical populism or ironic populism is characteristic of our age; 
genuine and progressive populism is not.25  
Despite official attempts to link free trade and general 
prosperity, at least since the mid-1990s free trade came to be 
associated in the public mind with job losses, and those pushing 
the free trade agenda paid little attention to these objections.26 
Despite the proliferation of law review articles on such “trade 
and” topics as trade and labor, trade and the environment, trade 
and national regulations, few academic specialists appeared 
daunted by the prospect of a sea change in the lives of millions 
of working people in the industrial zones of the United States 
and other advanced economies. 27  That manufacturers were 
                                                          
24 See Jeet Heer, Trump’s Populism Is A Sham, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/139239/trumps-populism-sham (expressing 
strong doubts that Trump’s stated policies on outsourcing will lead to any 
results protective of workers).  
25 See Conor Lynch, There’s A Fake Populist in the White House—and Real 
Populism Is the Only Force That Can Defeat Him, SALON (Feb. 4, 2017), 
http://www.salon.com/2017/02/04/theres-a-fake-populist-in-the-white-house-
and-real-populism-is-the-only-force-that-can-defeat-him/ (arguing that Trump 
has misinterpreted public opinion, which favors pro-worker policies, and does 
not support Trump’s reactionary agenda).  
26 While most mainstream economists shared in the “free trade consensus,” 
certain did offer honest, well documented analyses demonstrating that a 
great deal of job loss in the US could be linked to free trade, particularly in 
the past 15-20 years. See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, 
The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in 
the United States, AM. ECON. REV., Oct. 2013, at 2121 (noting the dramatic 
effect on US employment levels of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001); see 
also Peter Dizikes, The Trade-Offs of Free Trade, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 23, 
2016) (describing how economist David Autor is trying to change American 
thinking on the issue of free trade, to explain that in the areas most affected 
by trade agreements, the effects have really been “a big deal”). Note that 
Autor does not promote protectionism, he identifies the rise in transfer 
payments following the shifting a manufacturing jobs to China and that 
transfer payments may be a means of redistributing the broader economic 
benefits of lowering manufacturing costs.  See Autor, supra, at 2155-59. 
27 See, e.g., Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage:  Combining Public and Private 
Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. 
INT’L. L.J. 203 (2007) (considering calls to integrate social standards and 
labor rights into free trade agreements); Jill Lynn Nissen, Achieving a 
Balance Between Trade and the Environment; the Need to Amend the 
WTO/GATT to Include Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 28 LAW & 
POL’Y. INT’L. BUS. 901 (1997) (analyzing the relationship between the WTO 
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transferring operations to hospitable labor sites like China and 
Mexico was known, but hardly registered as an “issue” worth 
exploring, politically or academically. Silently, and in an 
atmosphere of quiet resentment on the part of the workers, the 
factories kept closing.28 No one knew when this process would 
come to an end, or if it would ever end. No one seemed to fully 
understand what the end game was, or what forces were at work 
beneath the surface. Week by week, the structure of national 
economies was changing and evolving, and most people felt less 
secure about the economic future. That more globalization 
brought about more international inequality is also 
unmistakable.  
This failure to address the anxieties caused at least in 
part by “free trade”, especially considering the outlandish 
promises that had been made to the rank and file of workers in 
many countries, was an example of intellectual and political 
neglect that is hard to fathom.29 How could the value or meaning 
of “free trade” laws be analyzed without taking the hard fact of 
job losses, job insecurity and destruction of smaller businesses 
into account? And yet, this state of affairs lasted almost 
unchanged at the level of political discourse until the 
earthquake of the Presidential campaign season of 2015-2016.  
During that campaign, the long-buried issues of trade, 
jobs and a traditional economic and social identity burst into the 
open, with the ideological victory going to those who had first 
grasped hold of the issue and used it for their own political 
reasons. Most notable in this group, of course, was Donald 
Trump, whose campaign would almost certainly have been a 
                                                                                                                                                
and multilateral environmental agreements following the Uruguay Round of 
GATT and suggesting amendments to GATT will be necessary); Debra M. 
Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms:  
Importing Caution into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 Food & Drug L.J. 167 (2006) 
(reviewing disparate food labeling regulations around the world and 
suggesting a uniform international regulatory regime be implemented).  
28 See, e.g., Paul Harris, ‘I’m Sick to My Stomach’:  Anger Grows in Illinois at 
Bain’s Latest Outsourcing Plan, GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2012), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/10/illinois-workers-bain-
outsourcing (describing Bain Capital’s role in an Illinois plant closure, during 
which the affected American workers were required to train the Chinese who 
would have their jobs after the outsourcing was completed). 
29 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, NAFTA’s Legacy:  Growing U.S. Trade Deficits 
Cost 682,900 Jobs, ECON. POL’Y. INST. (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/nafta-legacy-growing-us-trade-deficits-cost-
682900-jobs/ (noting that Bill Clinton promised that NAFTA would increase 
good-paying American jobs, but that things did not turn out as Clinton has 
predicted). 
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failure had it not been for his early grasp of the fact that voters 
in the “Rust Belt” constituted a large, untapped and to some 
extent overlooked voting bloc ripe for picking.30 As implausible 
as it was that a New York casino mogul would seriously 
champion the traditional working class at the level of economic 
policy, the prospect of manufacturing jobs being returned to the 
American heartland was a seemingly irresistible siren call.31 
Trump’s followers wanted to believe that he would represent 
their views to multinational manufacturers, tempting them with 
fabulous “deals” to remain in the United States, employing 
people in traditional pursuits at traditionally high wages. That 
belief, along with a healthy dose of resentment against 
immigrants, minorities and foreign governments gave the 
election season an unusually high degree of political heat, and 
an often-demagogic seduction.32  
 
IV. WHY WASN’T THE TRADE AND JOB SECURITY ISSUE 
OBVIOUS TO ALL? 
 
As someone who wrote doggedly about trade law and the 
effects on labor from the mid-1990s onward, I was well aware 
that this explosive issue was broadly ignored. It seemed self-
evidently true to me that there was a problem with using 
                                                          
30  See Moshe Marvit, Trump Promised to Help Workers in the Rust Belt. 
Here’s How He Can Show He’s Serious, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/08/trump-
promised-to-help-workers-in-the-rust-belt-heres-how-he-can-show-hes-
serious/?utm_term=.fd0274dadd97 (noting that “Donald Trump hung his 
winning presidential campaign on the idea that he alone could bring back 
American jobs.”). 
31 See Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of 
Populism:  Economic Have-nots and Cultural Backlash 11 (Harv. Kennedy 
Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP16-026, Aug. 2016), 
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1401 
(summarizing common explanation for rise in populism and why economically 
vulnerable populations gravitate towards authoritarian leaders when 
migrants and terrorism threaten their way of life, including their jobs in 
manufacturing); Nathan M. Jensen et al., Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and 
the Global Competition for Investment, INT’L. STUD. Q., Dec. 2013, at 6-7 
(discussing survey finding group more likely to vote for governor willing to 
provide tax incentives to manufacturer locating facility in state).    
32 See Jill Abramson, Trump’s Rise is the Return of the Demagogue, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/29/donald-trump-us-
election-2016-demagogue (recapping a trump event filled with an angry 
crowd lashing out at lass of manufacturing jobs and mass immigration and 
observing similarities between past demagogic and segregationist candidates 
like George Wallace and Ross Perot).  
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eighteenth century free trade doctrines as a means to allow 
multinational corporations to save on their labor costs.33 David 
Ricardo, in an age far less technologically advanced and without 
the possibility of mobile manufacturing, emphasized national 
specialization based on national advantages in the manufacture 
of certain goods.34 In our own age, when “free trade” would allow 
for global competition between different labor pools, the 
implications were completely different. Of course, it must be 
noted that many of the job losses apparently “caused” by the 
operation of free trade agreements were in fact the result of 
automation, and that free trade in and of itself is not the sole 
cause of economic disruption. 35  However, it consistently 
bothered me that the element of global “labor competition” took 
little if any part in mainstream analyses of international trade 
law studies. From a commonsense point of view, this aspect of 
the global “free movement of goods” must be of grave concern to 
people working in the manufacturing sector in the more 
advanced economies—logically, how could it not be?  
 It gives me no great pleasure to have been right on this 
issue. From the time international trade law became a “law 
school” subject in the mid-1990s, trade law scholars completely 
missed the larger “job loss” implications, having spent the 
greatest amount of time parsing and analyzing legal issues that 
                                                          
33  See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Opportunism and the WTO:  Corporations, 
Academics, and ‘Member States’, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:  THE 
STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 53, 54 (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter Opportunism and the WTO] (emphasizing that post-1995 trade 
law is not based on comparative advantage, it is based on the needs of 
transnational businesses); see also Dillon, Opportunism Revisited, supra note 
23, at 1020 (arguing instead of focusing on individual trade disputes, trade 
scholars should focus on opportunistic corporations and the “underpinnings of 
the entire global trade system”); Sara Dillon, A Farewell to “Linkage”:  
International Trade Law and Global Sustainability Indicators, 55 Rut. L. 
Rev. 87, 112 (2002) [hereinafter A Farewell to “Linkage”] (noting Ricardo 
himself knew that theory of comparative advantage only made sense if both 
capital and labor were immobile).   
34 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 49-50 (11th ed. 2009) (discussing Ricardo’s discovery of the principle 
of comparative advantage).  The principle of comparative advantage, in 
theory, allows a country to benefit even when trading with a country that 
makes a product less efficiently than it because the country is able to 
specialize in and produce more of another product it makes even more 
efficiently than the product being traded.  See id.  
35 See Brian Heater, Technology Is Killing Jobs, and Only Technology Can 
Save Them, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 26, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/26/technology-is-killing-jobs-and-only-
technology-can-save-them/. 
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were—from the point of view of ordinary people-- essentially a 
sideshow.36  In the mid-1990s, trade law moved from economics 
departments to law schools, and it is easy to explain why.  This 
was because 1990s trade agreements like those of the WTO and 
NAFTA created genuinely “enforceable” dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and legal academics feel at home studying 
disputes:  the details of the disputes, the legal provisions being 
invoked, and similar comfortably “legal” issues.37 While there is 
nothing wrong with an academic approach that centers on trade 
disputes per se, this disproportionate focus tended to mask the 
real “action”--political, legal and economic:  that the robust 
elimination of most trade barriers due to the trade agreements 
of the 1990s opened the door to an unprecedented mobility of 
manufacturing.38 When a product can flow freely without fiscal 
or regulatory impediments, it can also be manufactured in any 
convenient location. That is part of the indisputable logic of 
eliminating most barriers to trade in goods, wherever 
manufactured.39  It wasn’t so much foreign governments that 
took advantage of that reality—rather, it was American 
multinational corporations that took the opportunity to further 
enrich themselves at the expense of silently frustrated American 
workers.  
It may seem obvious, though it went surprisingly 
unremarked by mainstream commentators and academics, that 
mobility of manufacturing meant that workers in the US and 
elsewhere would be competing, quite literally, with workers in 
                                                          
36 Of course, some—though not many—trade law scholars saw and analyzed 
the problem of trade agreements versus workers’ rights. See, e.g., Chantell 
Taylor, NAFTA, GATT and the Current Free Trade System:  A Dangerous 
Double Standard for Workers’ Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y. 401 
(2000) (comparing corporate rights under NAFTA and GATT and workers’ 
rights under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation). 
37 See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade 
Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251 (2006) (noting the transition for a negotiation-based 
to a rules-based, legal dispute oriented free trade system). 
38 See Nicholas R. Lardy, Issues in China’s WTO Accession, BROOKINGS (May 
9, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wto-
accession/ (describing the dynamic process by which a national economy, in 
this case China’s, becomes embedded in free trade structures and draws in 
foreign manufacturers).  
39  See David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?:  The Real Issue Lurking 
Behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L. L. 279, 312 (2001) 
(questioning disparate meanings of free trade and noting any tax or 
regulation constitutes some form of trade barrier, often intended to 
disadvantage foreign producers).   
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lower-wage countries. 40   This kind of very dramatic wage 
competition would lead inevitably to a significant number of job 
losses, and would transform the economy and even the basic 
tenor of life itself. 
 The power of labor depends in large measure on the 
employer not having a “choice”—if the negotiating worker can be 
easily replaced (in this case by workers abroad), there is little 
incentive for the employer to give heed to the wishes of the 
workforce.41 As mentioned above, there is lively debate over the 
number of jobs lost due to wage competition versus 
automation—the fact remains, though, that middle-class 
American workers simply could not successfully compete with 
workers making one tenth or one quarter of what US workers 
expected to earn.42 No number of “side agreements” on labor and 
environmental standards could alter this hard fact.43 Asserting 
that American workers are “the best in the world” does not 
change the reality that the wage differentials in different parts 
of the world are striking. Manufacturers would chase cheaper 
labor in other parts of the world--notably in China--and the 
American heartland that counted on factory jobs would be 
hollowed out.44 This uncomfortable truth was rarely mentioned 
in political speeches, yet was one of the main elements of a 
                                                          
40 See Uri Dadush & William Shaw, Is the Labor Market Global?, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/03/is-labor-market-global-pub-46388 
(writing that “[t]he labor market is integrated in the sense that workers are 
competing for the same jobs, even if the jobs move to the workers rather than 
the other way around.”).  
41 See Kim Moody, What to Know About the WTO:  A Union Activist’s Guide, 
LABOR NOTES (Feb. 1, 2000), http://www.labornotes.org/2000/02/what-know-
about-wto-union-activists-guide (denying that the WTO was really about 
creating “rules based trade,” but instead about enhancing the power of 
multinational corporations vis a vis governments and labor unions).  
42 See DEAN MCFARLIN & PAUL D. SWEENEY, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT:  
STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES & CULTURAL CHALLENGES 340-43 (5th ed. 2015) 
(observing difficulty American workers have keeping up with hard-working 
and technically trained workers in China and India that work for one tenth 
the pay of Americans).    
43  See Joel Solomon, Trading Away Rights:  The Unfulfilled Promise of 
NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (April 2001), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nafta/nafta0401.pdf (identifying structural 
weaknesses and cautious use of the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation as major impediments to its success). 
44 See Trymaine Lee, The Heartland:  Life and Loss in Steel City, MSNBC 
(Sept. 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/geographyofpoverty-
heartland-1 (exploring the shocking level of deprivation caused by factory 
closures in the worst-affected areas of the United States).  
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“changed world” for workers in the manufacturing sector in the 
United States and elsewhere. 
Thus, far from the specialized scenes of trade law 
conferences, workers who saw their jobs disappear were 
apparently, and not surprisingly, growing angrier. As I had been 
writing about this disconnect for years, my original view was 
confirmed. Indeed, the likelihood of such an eventual reaction by 
American labor struck me forcefully, virtually from the very 
moment the WTO came into being.45 It was clear to me that the 
traditional trade model of exporting one’s national goods and 
importing the national goods of other countries and regions was 
breaking down as an operative concept. 46  Mobility of 
manufacturing became an imperative for American 
manufacturers, as big box stores practically ordered American 
companies to reduce product prices below a certain bottom 
line.47  
As I saw the problem from the late 1990s onward, the 
discipline of trade law studies had become fixated on narrow 
questions relevant to the WTO disputes in particular.  This was 
troublesome not only because it was a distraction of sorts. More 
concerning, it fostered the illusion, or was based on the illusion, 
that global trade had an inherent “nation versus nation” 
dimension—whereas in fact, multinational corporations did not 
much care where they operated, either from a manufacturing, 
profit-making or tax- paying point of view. 48  The eighteenth 
century paradigm, as mentioned above, was one in which 
nations produced certain goods, goods which they then traded 
with other nations, for goods produced by those other nations.49 
                                                          
45 See, e.g., Dillon, A Farewell to “Linkage”, supra note 33, at 112 (calling for 
an empirical approach to adverse effects of international trade agreements). 
46 See id. at 54 (describing the inadequacy of the concept of comparative 
advantage in modern times). 
47 See COMMANDING HEIGHTS PBS (2002) (indicating retailers like Walmart 
required U.S. firms to purchase from Chinese factories to lower costs); see 
also Hiroko Tabuchi, Walmart’s Imports From China Displaced 400,000 Jobs, 
A Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/business/economy/walmart-china-
imports-job-losses.html. 
48 See Dillon, Opportunism Revisited, supra note 23, at 1020-22 (explaining 
one must consider wishes of powerful transnational corporations to 
understand trade agreements and arguing WTO should shift focus away from 
nation verse nation disputes).   
49 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World 
Trade Constitution, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 521–25 (2000) (explaining, in theory, free trade 
benefits all countries over time).  
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But by 1995 and beyond, such a conception of international 
trade was misleading at best. Much of the “trade” the US did 
with China involved goods made in China by US-based 
corporations. 50  As with tax avoidance, US and other 
multinationals were heavily involved in “labor rights avoidance”, 
and wanted to have full access to the globe in search of the best 
labor at the lowest possible price.51 This was possible precisely 
because trade laws had, from the end of World War II, led in the 
direction of eliminating tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, and 
increasingly even regulatory barriers. If goods and services can 
move freely without impediment, so can manufacturers.  
In short, the trade laws that were promulgated in the 
1990s attempted to ensure a permanent, unendingly neoliberal 
approach to international commerce. 52  The idea was that 
governments would come and go, but free trade rules would 
remain enshrined in international law, as received by virtually 
all trading nations of the world.53 The WTO became a forum for 
the display of legal virtuosity by such rising nations as India 
and Brazil.54 The operation of the WTO made it seem as if the 
world economy would inevitably remain integrated in nature, 
and that the future was knowable.55 
                                                          
50 See Chad P. Brown, U.S.-China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the WTO, 
33 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., 27, 38-39 (Winter/Spring 2009 (highlighting 
factors U.S. must consider when making threats towards China, including 
that many Chinese exports derive from subsidiaries of U.S.-based 
multinational corporations).   
51 See Lance A. Compa, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and the Battle for Labor 
Rights, CORNELL U. ILR SCH. (2001), 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1376&contex
t=articles. 
52  See FAUX, supra note 7, at 179-80 (describing constitutional components of 
NAFTA and the WTO); see also Dillon, Opportunism Revisited, supra note 23, 
at 1031 (remarking on immutable, constitutional aspects of WTO’s trade 
rules).  
53 See Dillon, Opportunism Revisited, supra note 23, at 1017 (pointing out 
Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations constitutionalized free trade ideas and 
placed policies out of political leaders’ reach).  
54 See Dillon, Opportunism and the WTO, supra note 33, at 66 (naming Brazil 
and India as countries clearly using the WTO to their strategic national 
advantage).   
55 The need for predictability (as opposed to the uncertain outcomes of a more 
politicized system) was the core rationale for the creation of the WTO’s newly 
enforceable system of dispute settlement. See Introduction to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s3p1_e
.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2017) (noting that “A central objective of the 
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V. MESSAGE TO CANDIDATE CLINTON ON THE ANTI-TRADE 
WAVE 
 
When Barack Obama was first elected president in 2008, 
it seemed he wanted to carry out some version of a do-over of 
America’s trade relations with the rest of the world.56 For a 
time, it seemed as if he would consider rewriting NAFTA or even 
terminating America’s involvement in the WTO.57 None of this, 
of course, happened, despite his criticism of unfettered free 
trade. 58  Instead, quietly and persistently, the Obama 
administration moved to create even more ambitious free trade 
structures, including the now notorious TPP and TTIP. 59  It 
appears that over time, President Obama came to emphasize not 
the job-loss dimension of free trade, but rather the geopolitical 
aspects, through which global alliances are fostered, and global 
power exerted.60  
It is important to emphasize that free trade has this 
second, non-economic dimension in the realm of global 
                                                                                                                                                
(WTO) dispute settlement system is to provide security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system.”).  
56  See Barack Obama on Free Trade, ON THE ISSUES, 
http://www.ontheissues.org/2008/Barack_Obama_Free_Trade.htm (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2017) (indicating that then-candidate Obama was strongly 
critical of existing free trade structures and determined to fundamentally 
alter them—which in the end, he arguably did not seriously attempt to do).    
57 See id.   
58 See Jaime Fuller, Why Almost Everyone Hates the Trade Deal Obama’s 
Negotiating in Japan, WASH. POST (April 23, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/23/why-almost-
everyone-hates-the-trade-deal-obamas-negotiating-in-
japan/?utm_term=.079e46f9d892 (explaining that, despite Obama’s insistence 
that the Trans-Pacific Partnership was the new “gold standard” for trade 
agreements, it was meeting resistance from many different quarters, 
politically and geographically).  
59 See, e.g., Trevor Timm, The TTIP and TPP Trade Deals:  Enough of the 
Secrecy, GUARDIAN (May 4, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/04/ttip-tpp-trade-
deals-secrecy-greenpeace-leak (decrying the lack of transparency in the 
negotiating of these two major trade agreements sought by President Obama 
as part of his legacy).  
60 See I.M. Destler, America’s Uneasy History with Free Trade, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Apr. 28, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/americas-uneasy-history-with-
free-trade (suggesting that the “New Democrats” support for free trade is 
based on its ability to buttress U.S. leadership role in international economy). 
Although President Obama did not focus much on trade in his first term, he 
became an active advocate for the Trans-Pacific Partnership in his second 
term and argued the agreement was vital to global partnerships and the 
establishment of rules for the global economy. See id.  
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leadership, and Obama realized over time that the US could 
exert influence through expanded regional trade agreements.61 
As is well known, these two ambitious, large-scale agreements 
that would further extend the reach of free trade laws in the 
direction of Asia and the EU, became toxic political subjects 
during the 2015-2016 presidential campaign. All major 
candidates of the 2016 presidential race disavowed the TPP, and 
the assumption is that it has died a quiet death.62 From the time 
then candidate Trump took up the issue of trade and job losses, 
there was no going back to the earlier status quo, and decades of 
failure to mention the inconvenient facts on employment effects 
had to be paid for.  
During the 2015-2016 presidential campaign, it became 
obvious that Donald Trump had essentially expropriated the 
issue of trade and jobs.63 I marveled at the fact that the Clinton 
campaign had not figured out a way to “own” that issue, or to 
confront it. After twenty years of hearing that free trade would 
lead to more and better jobs (in some cases it has, but in many 
not), the American public was tired of the pro-free trade rhetoric 
and required something more concrete.64 Reflecting their long-
                                                          
61 See William Finnegan, Why Does Obama Want This Trade Deal So Badly, 
THE NEW YORKER (June 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/why-does-obama-want-the-trans-pacific-partnership-so-badly 
(suggesting that Obama’s chief motivation was to enhance U.S. influence in 
Asia and reduce China’s).  
62 During the 2016 presidential campaign season, all major candidates were 
of the stated view that the TPP was flawed and should not be pursued. See 
2016 Presidential Candidates on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal, 
BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/2016_presidential_candidates_on_the_Trans-
Pacific_Partnership_trade_deal (last visited Aug. 22, 2017); see also Trump 
Signs Executive Order to Formally Withdraw the US From the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Trade Deal, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/23/trump-signs-executive-order-to-formally-
withdraw-the-us-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal.html 
(reporting that Trump called this act of withdrawal a “great thing for the 
American worker”).  
63 See, e.g., Cristiano Lima, Trump Calls Trade Deal ‘A Rape of Our Country’, 
POLITICO (June 28, 2016, 8:20 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-trans-pacific-
partnership-224916 (noting the inflammatory rhetoric used by Trump to 
describe existing trade agreements and the politicians who had supported 
them). 
64 See Diane Stafford, Campaign Anti-trade Rhetoric Won’t Lead to Quick 
Changes after Elections, Experts Say, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 3, 2016. 04:37 
PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/article112379237.html 
(describing one expert as saying that “Great disbelief in ‘experts’ and feelings 
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running bafflement with the process of job loss and factory 
closings, many gravitated to Trump’s promise that he would 
(somehow, through a method unspecified) force companies to 
remain in the United States and not move abroad to 
manufacture. If they did move abroad, he insisted, he would slap 
their imports into the United States with a “35% tariff.” When 
he repeated that simplistic formula, to many listeners it 
sounded like a concrete plan; like something could be done 
besides lamenting the factory losses and proposing job 
retraining.65  
There are many legal, economic and factual difficulties 
surrounding Trump’s by now famous assertion. However, it was 
indisputable that Trump had taken what should have been in 
general terms a progressive policy position (saving jobs through 
better regulation of the problems caused by outsourcing) and 
turned it into a personal crusade. He told his audiences time 
and again that he alone could save their jobs and their fading 
middle class lifestyles.66 He would vindicate their disappointed 
expectations, their broken communities, and stop treating the 
effects of free trade as inevitable. It was a highly effective 
strategy. Indeed, this was likely the one and only issue Trump 
benefited from enough to push him over the top to win the 
Electoral College. 
In the early spring of 2016, I saw this political 
configuration on the horizon and wrote a brief memo, intended 
to be shared with the Clinton campaign.67 It is likely it never 
reached the campaign, or if it did, that it was not successfully 
channeled.  The essence of the memo was this:  That 
mainstream politicians had utterly failed to address the anger 
felt by formerly middle-class people who attributed their job 
                                                                                                                                                
of being left out of prosperity are pervasive among both British and American 
voters”).  
65  See Sahil Kapur, Trump’s ‘Retribution’ Tax Stirs Questions, GOP 
Resistance, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-05/trump-s-retribution-
tax-stirs-legal-questions-gop-resistance (highlighting importance of Trump’s 
tariff threat to white voters without college degrees that made up one third of 
2016 electorate and helped Trump win rustbelt states). 
66 See Michael Martinez, Why Ford Made Trump Look Like A Jobs Savior, 
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Nov. 18, 2016), 
http://www.autonews.com/article/20161118/BLOG06/161119824/why-ford-
made-trump-look-like-a-jobs-savior (writing that “[i]f you ask Donald Trump, 
he just saved thousands of US jobs that big, bad Ford Motor Co. was about to 
move to Mexico.” The writer continues, “[t]o borrow a line from his recent 
presidential debate performance: ‘Wrong’”).  
67 Memo on file with author. 
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losses and economic decline to the effects of free trade. Rather 
than coming up with actual laws that would deal directly with 
outsourcing (by creating clear and fairly applied penalties and 
disincentives for outsourcing US jobs to lower-wage countries), 
Trump was transforming the issue into a United States versus 
Country X kind of issue:  i.e , US versus Mexico, US versus 
China.68 In fact, it was US companies that had sought out the 
cheaper labor and more advantageous regulatory environments 
offered by these countries, but Trump decided to present the 
problem as if the host countries for American investment were 
acting to the detriment of the US.69 Trump’s strategy had the 
two-fold effect of channeling working class anger against the 
“elites” who had allowed the factory closures, and also of 
channeling that same anger against foreigners and their 
governments.  
It seemed that it would have been relatively easy at that 
point for Hillary Clinton to acknowledge the problem and 
reframe it, offering a much better, more rational and effective 
remedy in the form of legally-defined penalties for US companies 
engaging in outsourcing behavior.  Needless to say, Secretary 
Clinton did not set out any such clearly defined solutions to the 
problem of jobs outsourcing. 70  Donald Trump continued to 
emphasize the issue of trade and jobs, occasionally berating US 
companies, but more particularly the countries in which they 
were setting up manufacturing outlets, and crucially, the 
politicians who had entered into supposedly “bad deals.”71 This 
                                                          
68 See Jeffrey Bartash, Trump Calls US-Mexico Trade One-sided—and Here’s 
the Reality, MARKET WATCH (Jan. 27, 2017), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-calls-us-mexico-trade-one-sided-
heres-the-reality-2017-01-26; see also Joseph Stiglitz, Trump’s Most Chilling 
Economic Lie, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 17, 2017), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/02/donald-trump-china-economics-trade 
(pointing out that “the very Americans who have been among the losers of 
globalization stand to be among the losers of a reversal of globalization—
including a trade war. History cannot be put into reverse.”).  
69 See Matthew Yglesias, Donald Trump Is Going to Bring Us Trade Wars, 
Big Time, VOX (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/1/20/14323686/trummp-trade-war (referring to Trump’s “plan to 
use ad hoc tariffs to initiate and ‘win’ trade wars with foreign countries.”).   
70  See Kellan Howell, Hillary Clinton’s Outsourcing Problem With Union 
Workers, CIRCA (July 25, 2016), 
https://www.circa.com/story/2016/07/25/politics/hillary-clintons-outsourcing-
problem-with-union-workers (describing negative reactions to her stated idea 
that much of the outsourcing that has happened was “inevitable”). 
71 See Vicki Needham, Trump Vows to Overhaul “Horrible” Trade Deals, THE 
HILL (July 21, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/288812-trump-vow-to-
overhaul-us-trade-policy (quoting then-candidate Trump as stating the he 
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put the focus on himself as capable of delivering a remedy, 
rather than increasing the understanding of the public as to the 
reasons for the phenomenon, or committing to create legally 
appropriate incentives and penalties.72  In the end, of course, 
Trump won the presidency and has to a lesser extent continued 
on the same path of personal trade savior. 
 
VI. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR FREE TRADE POLICIES 
 
In order to fully appreciate the trade-based historical 
drama we witnessed in 2015-2016, we need to understand the 
post-World War II free trade ethos, the acceleration of 
manufacturing job losses within the United States and the 
faulty interpretation placed on all this by Donald Trump, while 
simultaneously taking credit for being the person able to “do 
something” about America’s trade-based economic insecurity.  
It is obvious that “free trade” has brought economic 
diversity and prosperity to many societies over thousands of 
years.73 Trade is as common to the restless human species as 
population movement itself. In the modern age, the eighteenth 
century saw an explosion in sea-borne trade, buoyed by the 
supporting theory of “comparative advantage.”74  According to 
the concept of comparative advantage, nations would always 
benefit from specializing in that which they were relatively 
better at making.75 They could then trade with other nations 
                                                                                                                                                
would “never sign any trade agreement that hurts our workers, or that 
diminishes our freedom and independence.”). This emphasis on what the 
President will or will not sign gives the mistaken impression that there are 
no other dynamics at play, and that the issue hinges on the determination of 
one person not to “sign” the bad agreement.  
72 See David Lawder & David Shepardson, Trump Is Preparing Orders to 
Review Trade Deals, Procurement: Officials, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/03/24/trump-executive-order-trade-deal/. 
73 See generally WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE 
SHAPED THE WORLD (2008) (providing a comprehensive look at the processes 
that drove virtually all civilizations to trade, and how these complex 
processes led to the modern world as we know it).  
74 See K.N. Chaudhuri, The Structure of the Indian Textile Industry in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, INDIAN ECON. & SOC. HISTORY REV., 
Apr. 1974, at 127, 139-40 (discussing trading relationship between Britain 
and Bengal and noting shift towards sea-borne trade due to lower costs and 
comparative advantage in Bengal).   
75 See Murray N. Rothbard, The Ricardian Law of Comparative Advantage, 
MISES INSTITUTE (April 26, 2012), https://mises.org/library/ricardian-law-
comparative-advantage (contrasting the earlier and simpler notion of 
national “absolute advantage,” with the more challenging concept of 
comparative advantage).  
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from the goods they had decided to specialize in. David Ricardo 
popularized this idea, which in the end boiled down to the 
truism that it always paid for nations to specialize and trade 
with one another in the products of that specialization.76 All 
nations should then focus on producing those items that they 
were able to make relatively more efficiently, a process that 
would always lead to relatively better outcomes.77 
This doctrine of comparative advantage, an intellectual 
antique, is hardly suited to the modern era. 78  As mentioned 
above, it derives from an age when manufacturing was 
inherently immobile—with a static relationship to geography. In 
reality, the doctrine says no more than prosperity though 
product prioritization: prosperity in each country will be greater 
if each nation decides which products it is best at producing and 
sticks to those products. Do not try to make everything you can 
make, even if you can make a wide variety of things better than 
others. It pays to specialize, as more wealth will be generated. 
Arithmetically, it seemed an attractive proposition. But for use 
in the world of the early 21st century, it does not seem to amount 
to much.79 
This seemingly simple idea has proven very enduring, in 
part because of a lack of conceptual competition. Over centuries, 
through periods of open trade borders and relative 
protectionism, “comparative advantage” has propelled countries 
forward, often without much attention being paid to the 
empirical effects of trade liberalization. Especially in the 1990s, 
when the world turned in the direction of predictable, 
enforceable trade laws, the focus was almost completely on the 
imagined benefits of more and more free trade, and greater 
elimination of all kinds of trade barriers, tariff and non-tariff.80 
                                                          
76 See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 34, at 48 (exhibiting importance of 
specialization to obtaining benefits of comparative advantage).   
77 See Rothbard, supra note 75.  
78  See Reinhard Schumacher, Deconstructing the Theory of Comparative 
Advantage, 2 WORLD SOCIAL & ECON. REV. 84 (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://wer.worldeconomicsassociation.org/files/WEA-WER2-Schumacher.pdf 
(noting that for Ricardo, the immobility of labor and capital were taken for 
granted, an assumption that is obviously outdated today).  
79 See Vladimir A. Masch, The Myth of Comparative Advantage, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/vladimir-a-masch/the-
myth-of-comparative-a_b_581814.html (stating that the law of Comparative 
Advantage “is not a true ‘law’—at best, it is a rule of thumb, not often 
applicable).   
80 See Kyle Bagwell, Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, Is the WTO Passé?, 
54:4 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1125 (2016), 
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Statements were made about the explosion of prosperity that 
would be generally experienced by participating countries; few 
bothered to question this orthodoxy, and its proponents almost 
always prevailed in debate.81  
As regional and global trade rules became more binding, 
more enforceable and more generally legalistic throughout the 
1990s, the effects of free trade in people’s lives—including the 
negative effects—began to be felt. As described above, the 
traditional ideal of free trade is that there are “national” 
products and these products are traded with other national 
products, in a virtuous chain of events. However, it became quite 
apparent that one of the main motivations behind the trade 
agreements, which allowed products to flow without impediment 
across borders, was to facilitate mobility of manufacturing. 82  
The decision of companies to relocate in cheaper wage locations 
(and lower regulation nations) was not random or sporadic. 
Large retailers, and by extension consumers, demanded that the 
bottom line cost of products should be lower, and factories 
shuttered and moved to China, among other countries, to take 
advantage of these lower labor costs.83  
The logic of the terms of trade agreements could have 
made all this quite foreseeable. Yet, politicians and even trade 
law specialists rarely mentioned these possibly negative 
outcomes. While it is true that a great deal of manufacturing job 
loss is due to automation—and that this will continue—it was 
also starkly true that American workers were being passed over 
                                                                                                                                                
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~rstaiger/BBS_JEL_2016.pdf (describing the 
process of development of modern trade laws). 
81 See Dani Rodrik, The Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World:  Why So 
Late? Why Now? Will it Last?,  VOTING FOR REFORM:  DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL 
LIBERALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 61, 62 (Stephen Haggard & 
Steven B. Webb eds. 1994) (describing developing countries’ rushing to free 
trade as if it were the “Holy Grail of economic development”); Helen V. 
Milner, The Political Economy of International Trade, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
91, 92 (1999) (describing flock to free trade regimes in 1990s and scholarly 
coverage of the phenomenon); Denise Froning, The Benefits of Free Trade:  A 
Guide for Policymakers, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 25, 2000), 
http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-benefits-free-trade-guide-
policymakers (promoting benefits free trade creates for all, including more 
options for consumers and the free flow of ideas as well as goods).   
82 See Dillon, Opportunism and the WTO, supra note 33, at 54 (concluding 
further mobility in manufacturing sought to escape organized labor and 
regulatory oversight in developed nations).   
83  See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S 
ECONOMIC RISE:  HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 10-12 (2017) (providing charts and analysis of China’s 
manufacturing dominance since the late 1970s). 
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in favor of workers who simply cost far less.84 The power of 
workers relative to the power of the corporation was 
substantially rewritten in the 1990s, and a certain quiet rage 
began to grow beneath the surface.85 As indicated above, trade 
scholars only rarely confronted this issue, preferring esoteric 
discussion of trade disputes, standards used by the global trade 
bodies, etc. It was assumed that the trade regime that had been 
put in place in the mid-1990s, designed to create a global 
marketplace—was now “constitutional” in nature, and would 
last essentially forever. Objections to the system were dismissed 
as “protectionist”.86 When the job loss issue was alluded to, it 
was in general terms, such as with a clichéd acknowledgment 
that there are “winners and losers” in the operation of free trade 
rules.87  
As also described above, there is a second, somewhat more 
hidden, justification for free trade as a policy. This justification 
is more political and does not pretend to be based on some 
immutable laws of economics.  This side of the free trade 
rationale is the preservation of peace, and the establishment of 
national influence. Almost as pervasive as the idea of 
comparative advantage is the idea that countries that engage in 
high levels of trade with one another are highly unlikely to 
engage in armed hostilities.88 Thus, as trade produces a more 
                                                          
84 See Robert E. Scott, Unfair Trade Deals Lower the Wages of US Workers, 
ECON. POL’Y. INST.: FACTSHEET (Mar. 13, 2015), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/unfair-trade-deals-lower-the-wages-of-u-s-
workers/ (noting that U.S. workers have been displaced and their bargaining 
power weakened through the operation of international trade agreements). 
85 See Heather Long & Patrick Gillespie, Why Americans Are So Angry in 
2016, CNN MONEY (Mar. 9, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/09/news/economy/donald-trump-bernie-
sanders-angry-america/index.html (writing that “[Americans] believe the 
middle class is dying, trade is killing US jobs and that their kids won’t have a 
chance to get ahead.”). 
86  See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, How to Demolish Protectionist Myths, 
GUARDIAN (July 5, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jul/05/free-trade-
protectionist-myths (writing, as one of the foremost “anti-protectionist 
writers,” about common protectionist arguments rejected by academics). 
87 See Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap:  Reforming 
the Law of Trade Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 797, 831-32 (analyzing 
effects of free trade, such as job loss and high unemployment rates, through 
winners to losers lens, and suggesting winners should provide “trade-related 
adjustment assistance” to losers). 
88  See JONATHAN SCHELL, THE UNCONQUERABLE WORLD:  POWER, 
NONVIOLENCE, AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 36 (2004) (“An unbroken thread 
of faith in free trade as an abettor of peace runs through the entire tradition 
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prosperous world, it is also believed to help create and preserve 
a more peaceful and stable one. 
Even before the end of World War II, the Allies 
demonstrated their belief that protectionism had been a 
contributing factor leading to war, and sought to remove 
barriers to post-war trade. 89  The Bretton Woods Agreements 
aimed at the creation of rules to guide a calmer, more 
prosperous and integrated post-war order, one in which free 
trade would be a centerpiece. 90  Agreed-upon rules would 
restrain national governments and push back against the 
temptation to indulge in nationalistic approaches to economic 
behavior.91  The GATT rules were designed to prevent “back- 
sliding”, and the multilateral GATT system was, interestingly, 
open to all interested nations. Like the EEC that followed in the 
1950s, the GATT had a clear political motivation.  While it is 
perhaps satisfying to consider that “peace and prosperity” are 
the twin pillars holding up the house of multilateral trade, it is 
also the case that the often unfounded faith in comparative 
advantage was able to shield the effects of trade rules from 
empirically-based scrutiny. In other words, the articles of faith 
that supported the GATT/WTO system had a dangerous 
tendency to mask signs of dissatisfaction with the system’s 
adverse effects.92 Thus, for those in the American heartland who 
watched as their local factories closed down and moved abroad, 
the indifference of policy makers became especially galling.  
The Age of Trump has been highly revealing in this sense. 
Even those who have been critical of the global trading system 
                                                                                                                                                
of liberal internationalism, surviving many disappointments and continuing, 
if in attenuated form, to this day.”). 
89 See Jason Margolis, The US Tried Extra-high Tariffs Before, in 1930. It 
Was A Disaster, PRI (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-02-01/us-
tried-extra-high-tariffs-1930-it-was-disaster (arguing that it was not until 
after World War I that “American leaders developed a new way of looking at 
commerce” that did not rely on high external tariffs).  
90  See ERIC HELLEINER, FORGOTTEN FOUNDATION OF BRETTON WOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE MAKING OF THE POSTWAR ORDER 
(2014). 
91 See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT’L. L. 379, 385-92 (1996) 
(providing a detailed history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)).  The GATT was the result of the Bretton Woods negotiations, the 
purpose of which was to establish a post-World War II global financial order, 
including a commitment to the elimination of trade barriers and adherence to 
free trade principles. See id.   
92 See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: 
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 410-26 (2002) (discussing 
the conflict and intersection of globalization and nationalism, and the role of 
free trade). 
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for its destructive effects on jobs must recognize that the second 
pillar of free trade--integration and peace--is a significant 
political asset. While Trump treats the trade dilemma as a 
simple matter of “jobs warfare”, a contentious, disruptive 
approach to trade agreements cannot be the correct solution, 
either. Demanding that factories that have gone to Mexico under 
NAFTA return to the US under pain of tariff punishment, or 
threatening war with China as a “trade enemy” is the antithesis 
of the actual peace that global trade rules have in fact fostered. 
In this sense, the “peace” pillar of free trade doctrine was more 
reliable than the prosperity pillar, and cannot be lightly set 
aside.93  In addition, the rules-based system that moved us away 
from a unilateralist and pressure-oriented approach to trade 
relations is also to be applauded.94 
To that extent, the international treaties that led to the 
creation of the WTO, NAFTA and other free trade agreements 
are properly seen as part of public international law and of the 
international rule of law in the post-World War II era. 95  As 
objectionable as a smug economic constitutionalism might have 
been in the wake of the WTO’s creation, the concept of a fully 
integrated economic world was far from a bad idea.96 Indeed, the 
fact that virtually all trading nations signed on to the WTO is 
telling.97 The fact that Russia was the last of the major economic 
                                                          
93 See Erich Weede, The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace By Globalization, 
THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW 165 (Fall 2004), 
http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_09_2_1_weede.pdf (arguing that, 
despite its vulnerabilities, free trade is the best way of fostering peace and 
prosperity).  
94  See Krzysztof J. Pelc, Will Trump’s Unilateral Trade Approach Work? 
History Says No, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/07/will-
trumps-unilateral-trade-approach-work-history-says-
no/?utm_term=.d4244a91e396 (arguing that options available for exerting 
unilateral trade pressure under US law did not prove to be successful in the 
years before the creation of the WTO).  
95 See Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How 
WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (2003) (describing the 
manner in which global trade law is now embedded in the larger framework 
of public international law).  
96 See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 658 (1996) 
(criticizing modern trade law but pointing out the enduring benefits, 
economic and political, of free trade).  
97 Nearly all important trading nations are now WTO members. One notable 
exception, however, is Iran. See Members and Observers of the WTO, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/org6_map_e.htm (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2017) (providing map indicating member and non-member 
countries). 
16:2  SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW   30 
powers to enter the WTO is also instructive.98 The global free 
trade regime cuts in several directions; generally negative from 
the point of view of labor rights, generally positive when seen in 
terms of international peace and technological advancement. 
More than anything, it was a failure to acknowledge the depth 
and severity of the socio-economic disruption accompanying 
NAFTA and the WTO that opened the door to Candidate 
Trump’s misrepresentations as to exactly what was wrong with 
modern trade agreements--or “deals” as he inaccurately called 
them. Also noteworthy to date is the degree to which he has 
failed to act on his promises to reject all of the “bad deals” and 
restore the earlier rights and protections of American workers.99  
 
VII. TRUMP AND THE WTO’S DSU—HOW MUCH WOULD HE 
LIKE TO DESTROY? 
 
During the “GATT” period, from 1947 through 1994—the 
United States and other nations navigated a trading system 
that was part rules of conduct, part sovereigntist power politics. 
Although there was a dispute resolution system within GATT, it 
was not accompanied by any credible enforcement mechanism, 
and states would often decide not to comply with adverse rulings 
handed down by panels.100 For instance, in the state-to-state 
dispute resolution process, if a decision of the panel was too 
burdensome in political terms for the losing party to comply 
with, that government would simply block the GATT panel 
decision, and ignore it. 101   If a GATT nation was willing to 
endure criticism and international political pressure, there was 
                                                          
98 See WTO: 2012 Press Release, WTO Membership Rises to 157 With the 
Entry of Russia and Vanuatu, WORLD TRADE ORG., (Aug. 22, 2012), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr671_e.htm (noting Russia’s 
2012 entry into the WTO). 
99 See Bryce Covert, Trump’s Terrible Deals, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/144273/trumps-terrible-deals (reviewing deals 
Trump has made with manufacturers so far and highlighting cost to 
government, based on tax benefits, per theoretical job, and fact that few 
factories are guaranteed or have been built yet).   
100 See Petko D. Kantchevski, The Difference Between the Panel Procedures of 
the GATT and the WTO: The Role of GATT and WTO Panels In Trade 
Dispute Settlement, 3 B.Y.U. INT’L. L. & MGMT. REV. 79, 80-91 (2006) 
(discussing the nature of the old GATT panel system and the innovations 
brought into trade law dispute resolution). 
101 There are many such examples, including the Tuna-Dolphin dispute.  See, 
e.g., WTO: Environment: Disputes 4, Mexico etc vs US: ‘tuna-dolphin’, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm 
(noting that “the panel report was never adopted even though some of the 
‘intermediary’ countries pressed for its adoption”).  
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no particular “real world” price to be paid for ignoring the 
ruling.  
The “Uruguay Round” period, from 1986-1994, roughly 
coincided with the EU’s “Single Market” negotiations, a time of 
hope and confidence in the expansion of free trade and the 
enforceable legal rules to go with it. Nothing less than true (thus 
coercive) enforceability would suffice, it was believed at the 
time.  International characters like Peter Sutherland were 
busily expounding on the bountiful effects of free trade and the 
evils of protectionism. 102  The willingness of national 
governments to cooperate with this massive project of 
judicializing trade rules can be put down to the lobbying of 
corporate interests, the determination of multinational 
companies to enforce neoliberal economics and unlimited access 
to cheaper and less regulated sites for investment. 103  The 
assumption was that international capital could continue its 
ever-outward expansion, and that the wisdom of this 
overarching policy would manifest itself, although not much 
attention was given to what the measurements of success would 
be. 
For better or worse, the WTO, along with NAFTA and the 
Single Market program in Europe, worked as intended. 
Economic integration accelerated, and the mobility of the 
multinational corporation was enhanced. There were few if any 
labor-based protections enacted to deal with the “losers” in 
international trade—and it was always acknowledged, even by 
the greatest cheer- leaders of free trade, that there would be 
                                                          
102 See Charles Pretzlik, View From the Top: Peter Sutherland, Chairman of 
BP, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2007), 
http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2007/12/14/financial-times-view-from-the-top-
peter-sutherland-chairman-of-bp/ (noting that “Peter Sutherand…is 
described by some as the father of globalisation. He ran the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and became the head of its successor body, 
the World Trade Organization.”).  Sutherland is notorious for his pro-
globalist advocacy.  
103  See, e.g., Bernhard Zangl, Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of 
Dispute Settlement Under GATT and the WTO, 52 INT’L. STUD. Q. 825 (2008) 
(comparing dispute resolution models and interests that influenced them); 
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global 
Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 9 (analyzing the agendas at 
work in the operation of the WTO’s dispute resolution system); Helena Paul 
& Ricarda Steinbrecher, Corporate Influence on International Regulatory 
Bodies, in HUNGRY CORPORATIONS: TRANSNATIONAL BIOTECH COMPANIES 
COLONISE THE FOOD CHAIN, ECONEXUS (Nov. 2003), 
http://www.econexus.info/publication/hungry-corporations (discussing corporate 
influence over the creation of the WTO).  
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“winners” and “losers.”104  Commentators usually said that the 
“losers” from free trade could be compensated by mechanisms 
created by national governments; the international system itself 
did not have to be concerned with this aspect of free trade. The 
logic of the newly enforceable rules—rules that had to be taken 
seriously—was that there were clear effects on labor markets, 
product supply chains and investment decisions.105  This broad 
transformation did not occur overnight, but as a process of 
accretion.  Free trade became entrenched in the minds of 
corporate decision-makers and left its mark on all aspects of the 
buying and selling of goods and services.106 The time period from 
1995 to the present is long in global economic terms. As with 
Brexit, one does not wave a wand and undo that much evolution 
without a great deal of disruption.107  
It is clear that the Trump campaign focused on the most 
traumatic symbol of the free trade drama:  the devastated 
community when the local factory shuts down, its parts sold off, 
and moves away to China, Mexico, Vietnam or some other lower 
cost jurisdiction.108 He channeled the resentment and confusion 
caused by those key events, painfully alive in the memories of 
many Americans, and articulated a sense of angry resistance. 
Whereas the so-called “elites” talked the language of economic 
                                                          
104 See Dani Rodrik, Too Late to Compensate Free Trade’s Losers, PROJECT 
SYNDICATE (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/free-trade-losers-compensation-too-late-by-dani-
rodrik-2017-04?barrier=accessreg (analyzing the “free trade winners and 
losers” issue). 
105  See, e.g., Yunling Zhang, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on 
Business Activity: A Survey of Firms in the People’s Republic of China, ASIAN 
DEV. BANK INST. (Oct. 2010), 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156106/adbi-wp251.pdf 
106  See How Businesses Use FTAs, AUSTL. GOV’T.: DEPT. FOREIGN AFF. & 
TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/Pages/how-to-use-ftas.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2017) (listing the variety of ways free trade agreements 
influence corporate decision-making). 
107  See A Textbook Lesson on Disruption: The Game-changing Brexit 
Referendum, DELOITTE, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/audit/articles/flip-side-brexit-
disruption.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2017) (describing how businesses can be 
completely surprised by geo-political changes like Brexit, having to alter 
strategies they believed to be fixed and certain).  
108 See David Jackson, Donald Trump Targets Globalization and Free Trade 
as Job-killers, USA TODAY (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/06/28/donald-
trump-globalization-trade-pennsylvania-ohio/86431376/ (summarizing 
Trump’s campaign speech in Pennsylvania and his focus on free trade, 
claiming globalization has left workers with nothing but “poverty and 
heartache” and made elites wealthier).   
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rationalism, orderly acceptance of this kind of natural evolution, 
Trump raged against the outsourcing phenomenon.109 However, 
his actual plans for ameliorating the outsourcing phenomenon 
itself remained extremely unclear, perhaps purposely so.110 In 
the American heartland, factories had been closing and moving 
away for well over twenty years; could this be fixed now, and 
could it be stopped abruptly? As explained above, while Trump 
occasionally criticized American corporations, his loudest wrath 
was reserved for the governments of China and Mexico, whom 
he accused of treating the US badly, under the terms of “bad 
deals” that successive American governments had allegedly 
allowed to be signed.111  
It is certainly possible for any national government to 
respond with determination to outsourcing, even taking into 
account debates over the labor market effects of automation 
(unrelated to outsourcing) and the open question of whether the 
jobs leaving the US can be profitably performed in the US 
anymore. 112  But in order not to jeopardize the peace and 
stability dimension of free global trade, such a change should 
                                                          
109 See Clarence Page, Economic Anxiety Fuels the GOP’s New “Trumpism”, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 25, 2016),  
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/page/ct-donald-trump-working-
class-page-perspec-0327-jm-20160325-story.html; see also Jeffrey Rothfeder, 
Why Donald Trump Is Wrong About Manufacturing Jobs and China, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-
donald-trump-is-wrong-about-manufacturing-jobs-and-china (arguing that 
the great slide of US jobs to China has slowed and is now reversing, as firms 
return manufacturing jobs to the US, a process known as onshoring).  
110 See Donald Trump Warns US Companies Will Face ‘Consequences’ For 
Outsourcing Jobs Overseas, ABC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-02/trump-warns-of-consequences-for-us-
companies-sending-jobs-abroad/8086536. 
111 See, e.g., Grace Donnelly, As Donald Trump Flirts with Trade Wars, These 
Are the Deals to Watch, FORTUNE (Feb. 28, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/02/28/trump-trade-nafta-china-eu/; Don Lee, Trump 
Wants to Cut Bilateral Trade Deals, But What If Nobody Comes to the Table?, 
LA TIMES (May 26, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-trade-
strategy-20170526-story.html (indicating that Trump believed he could 
replace multilateral trade agreements with supposedly preferable bilateral 
deals, though few other nations seemed interested in that prospect); 
Needham, supra note 71; see also Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), 
TWITTER (Mar. 5, 2018, 3:47 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/970626966004162560?lang=en.  
112 See Alex Lach, 5 Facts About Overseas Outsourcing:  Trend Continues to 
Grow as American Workers Suffer, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (July 9, 2012), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2012/07/09/11898/5-
facts-about-overseas-outsourcing/ (outlining the scope and scale of the 
outsourcing problem in America).  
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certainly not be brought about piecemeal or abruptly. That pro-
union progressives did not long ago establish a legislatively 
based message on the outsourcing issue is striking.113 As the 
political events of 2015-2016 demonstrated, silence in the face of 
the factory closure “drama” is extremely dangerous. 114  The 
mobility of manufacturing was not simply an annoying 
sideshow, bound to right itself in the end. It has long been an 
open wound, causing fear and pain across swaths of the United 
States since global trade rules made this logically inevitable.  
So what might genuinely effective legislation contain? 
The objective would have to be to slow the outflow of 
manufacturing jobs, while not causing disruption and panic 
across the national and global economies.  In that sense, there 
are really two main devices possible:  first, tax or other financial 
incentives and disincentives regarding factory 
closure/outsourcing, and second, legally enhanced labor 
protections, perhaps in the form of mandatory involvement of 
labor in decision-making on factory location.115 The first would 
                                                          
113 But see Nadia Prupis, Cornering Trump on Jobs, Sanders Announces Anti-
Outsourcing Bill, COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/11/28/cornering-trump-jobs-
sanders-announces-anti-outsourcing-bill (reporting Bernie Sanders’s 
introduction of legislation, aptly named the Outsourcing Prevention Act, 
aimed at keeping jobs in the US, in particular by placing a special tax on 
profits earned through US companies as a result of their outsourcing of jobs, 
and denying US loans and other benefits to companies engaged in 
outsourcing).  Senator Sanders compared his own proposed legislation to the 
approach being taken by President Trump, which was reliant on exhortation 
and promises of tax breaks, rather than firm legislatively-imposed conditions.  
See Bernie Sanders, Carrier Just Showed Corporations How to Beat Donald 
Trump, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/01/bernie-
sanders-carrier-just-showed-corporations-how-to-beat-donald-
trump/?utm_term=.165c3e0b4510. 
114  See Annie Karni, Clinton Rolls Out a New Message for Sanders—and 
Trump, POLITICO (Mar. 4, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/hillary-clinton-speech-message-bernie-
sanders-donald-trump-220287 (reporting on Clinton’s attempt to put forward 
a new message on the issue of trade and job losses, but that the message 
tended to be lost in the pressure coming from both Donald Trump and Bernie 
Sanders, each demanding a more strident approach to the problem).  
115  See Annie Ropeik, Flanked by Workers, Sen. Donnelly Previews Anti-
Outsourcing Bill, NPR (Jan. 13, 2017), http://wbaa.org/post/flanked-workers-
sen-donnelly-previews-anti-outsourcing-bill#stream/0 (reporting legislation 
that has been introduced so far focuses on penalties for firms that choose to 
outsource jobs).  Proposed legislation does not, however, provide workers the 
right to be involved in decision-making. It is also important to note that 
Trump has not expressed support for the draft legislation making the rounds, 
and instead has focused on blaming other countries, and—to the extent that 
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help to offset the obvious economic incentives created by NAFTA 
and the WTO, leading large corporations to move their 
production facilities to places of abundant cheap labor and lax 
environmental regulation. Such tax or financial counter 
measures would also have to be to some degree coercive:  moving 
a factory out of the US, without finding alternative jobs for 
displaced workers, would lead to some form of a fine, imposed by 
the nation on behalf of workers.  
The other approach would be to directly grant workers 
legal rights to weigh in on such decisions, and to make the 
location of factories and the protection of jobs a central aspect of 
their negotiations with management, even in the absence of a 
union. 116  That is, management would no longer have an 
unfettered, unilateral right to close and move factories, leaving 
communities devastated. For those who consider such legal 
innovations to be “unrealistic,” the only response is that we will 
then have to live with the existing situation. We cannot have it 
both ways. Undoing 25 years or more of free trade rules has 
other, and far more serious, negative effects in the form of trade 
wars and global political instability. 
The contrast between the approach taken by Candidate 
Trump during the presidential campaign and a robust 
legislative scheme designed to alter corporate behavior is stark. 
The former approach places the strongman in the position of 
“making deals” with foreign governments and US corporations, 
although it was never explained what the content of those deals 
would be.117 It is also not clear, in a world where trade rules 
have eliminated barriers to the free movement of goods, what 
                                                                                                                                                
he blames corporations—states that he will put special tariffs on products 
coming from factories that have been on the receiving end of outsourcing. In 
fact, Democrats in Congress have tried for years to pass anti-outsourcing 
legislation. See Lori Montgomery, Anti-outsourcing Bill Fails in Senate, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/28/AR2010092806143.html (noting that a solid 
bloc of Republicans, four Democrats, and Joe Lieberman, voted against the 
bill).  
116 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Offshore Outsourcing and Worker Rights, 48:3 
L. QUADRANGLE 69 (2006), 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1698&context=art
icles (observing the lack of worker protection in the outsourcing context and 
noting that unions have little control over decisions by corporations to 
outsource jobs).  
117 See Ben Casselman, Why Trump’s Carrier Deal Isn’t the Way to Save US 
Jobs, In Real Terms, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-trumps-carrier-deal-isnt-the-way-to-
save-u-s-jobs/. 
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exactly would stop the flow of goods, and thus the continued 
relocation of factories to other countries. It was not an act of 
“China” that led US firms to move to China. It was the operation 
of global trade rules fostered, supported and accepted by the US, 
as well as most other trading nations.118 While angry rhetoric 
might be appealing to the audience at a political rally, it is 
highly misleading as to cause and effect.119 Trump’s continued 
threat to unilaterally impose high tariffs on certain goods would 
lead inevitably to retaliation by other nations.120 
In its time, the 1990s free trade “dream” was not an 
entirely unworthy one. It was certainly manipulated by 
corporate interests, and the general public was hardly consulted 
as to issues of global “job sharing” and the real effects of creative 
destruction in the economy. Nevertheless, the other, positive 
side of the free trade equation concerned an integrated world, 
with fewer violent conflicts and more equitably distributed 
development. The logic of NAFTA, the WTO and other regional 
agreements guaranteed that corporations would be freed from 
any geographical loyalty, and many workers would be left to 
fend for themselves. Whether that could have been foreseen or 
not (and I believe that it could have been), the fact that most 
mainstream politicians have still failed to confront free trade’s 
discontents as late as 2016 is difficult to comprehend. And 
despite the fulminations of Candidate Trump, it is doubtful that 
this type of “populist” would have the knowledge, skill or will to 
confront and attempt to address the many problems left behind 
in the free trade wake. It is worth noting that at the time of this 
writing, the Democratic Party, gearing up for the 2018 mid-term 
elections, have released a policy on free trade agreements as 
                                                          
118 See Jeff Faux, NAFTA’s Impact on U.S. Workers, Econ. Policy Inst. (Dec. 9, 
2013), http://www.epi.org/blog/naftas-impact-workers/ (describing four ways 
NAFTA affected U.S.).  Faux explains that as a result of NAFTA:  1) 700,000 
American jobs were lost to Mexico; 2) U.S. workers were forced to accept 
lower wages; 3) Mexican farmers and their families migrated north and 
entered the U.S. labor market, often illegally; 4) rules for a global economy 
were established that benefited capital and labor costs.  See id.  
119  In the EU, the so-called “Acquired Rights” Directive (Transfer of 
Undertakings) does offer some protection to employees affected by 
outsourcing of jobs. See Charles Wynn-Evans, Does TUPE Apply to 
Offshoring?, EMPL. L.J., (Mar. 2008), 
https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/publication/2008/3/does-tupe-apply-to-
offshoring.html. 
120 See Patrick Gillespie, Mexico Warns Trump on Tariffs:  We’ll Respond 
‘Immediately’, CNNMONEY (Jan. 14, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/14/news/economy/donald-trump-mexico-tariffs-
response/index.html. 
Getting the “Message” on Free Trade: Globalization, Jobs and the World… 
 
 
 
37 
part of their new “better deal” strategy. It remains to be seen 
whether it will meet the challenge of better protecting workers 
while preserving the geopolitical gains derived from modern 
trade relations.121 
It seems that, with the rejection of the TPP and TTIP, and 
the discrediting of the WTO by the new US administration, we 
may have left behind one phase of the postwar multilateral 
ideal, and returned to a more sovereigntist, bilaterally focused 
age.122 While Brexit has been accepted as a reality, we do not 
know, and will not know for several years, whether and in what 
manner Brexit will “happen.”123 Middle class and working class 
voters may have the impression that they have pushed back 
against the “global elites,” but it is doubtful that the plutocrats 
and oligarchs of our time are that easily vanquished.124  
 
VIII. WHAT NEW AND BETTER “DEALS” SO FAR? 
 
Since the possibility of rejecting standard free trade policy 
came to light in a major way during the 2015-2016 presidential 
campaign, it is worth considering what steps have been taken, 
or threatened, by the Trump administration on the subject of 
international trade rules since January 2017. International 
                                                          
121 See David Weigel, Senate Democrats Unveil ‘Better Deal’ on Trade with 
new Restrictions on Outsourcing and Foreign Deals, Wash. Post (Aug. 2, 
2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/08/02/senate-
democrats-unveil-better-deal-on-trade-with-new-restrictions-on-outsourcing-
and-foreign-deals/?utm_term=.402025151770 (summarizing key trade 
components of Democrats “Better Deal” agenda).  The Democrats new trade 
outline includes seven core ideas, including a new “independent trade 
prosecutor” to supplement to the work of the U.S. Trade Representative, the 
creation of an “American Jobs Council” with the authority to block foreign 
investment that would cost U.S. jobs, and considering a federal contractors 
record on outsourcing before awarding them a federal contract.  See id.  
122 See Nicky Woolf, Justin McCurry & Benjamin Haas, Trump to Withdraw 
From Trans-Pacific Partnership on First Day in Office, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/donald-trump-100-
days-plans-video-trans-pacific-partnership-withdraw (noting that Trump 
would turn his attention to bilateral trade agreements in the future).   
123  See Silvia Amaro, Soros Suggests that Brexit Might Never Actually 
Happen, CNBC (June 1, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/01/soros-
suggests-that-brexit-might-never-actually-happen.html (suggesting that 
political developments might make continued membership in the EU 
desirable for Britain).  
124 See Peter Pham, Wealth Inequality Boosts Power of Oligarchs, FORBES 
(Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterpham/2015/12/04/oligarchs-
plutocrats-and-technocrats-oh-my/#7237e2bf45e6 (noting that power and 
wealth are now extraordinarily concentrated in a few hands).  
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trade is a shared responsibility and competence of the executive 
and legislative branches of government under the US 
Constitution; the president is not unfettered in how he can 
respond to what he considers to be “unfair” trade deals based on 
international agreements previously entered into by the United 
States.125 The American President unquestionably has a great 
deal of discretion in the realm of foreign affairs, but the 
Constitution specifically grants Congress competence in the 
management of commercial relations with foreign nations. 126 
Over time, Congress has delegated a great deal of power to the 
President to negotiate free trade agreements, with Congress 
generally having cast an up or down vote under the so-called 
“fast track” process.127 While Congress sets tariffs, the President 
has been granted the statutory authority to raise tariffs in times 
of economic or political emergency, including threats to national 
security.128 What is more, the major free trade agreements of the 
1990s were adopted by the United States in the form of federal 
statutes—thus creating a greater role for Congress than would 
be the case if these had been put through the Article III treaty 
ratification process.129 
In this regard, Trump’s first threat was that he would 
begin to slap 35% tariffs on products entering the United States, 
in situations where the product had previously been 
                                                          
125 See George Will, Congress, Not the President, Should Raise Tariffs, WASH. 
POST WRITERS GROUP (Feb. 16, 2017), http://newsok.com/article/5538138 
(noting Congress’s constitutional role in setting tariff rates, but also statutory 
delegation of such powers to the President under certain conditions). 
126  See Jonathan Masters, US Foreign Policy Powers:  Congress and the 
President, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 2, 2017), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-and-
president. 
127  See Caitlain Devereaux Lewis, Presidential Authority Over Trade:  
Imposing Tariffs and Duties, CONG. RES. SERV. (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44707.pdf. 
128 See infra note 136 and accompanying text (citing and discussing statute 
providing President authority to raise tariffs in emergency situations). 
129  See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 799, 801 (1995) (pointing out that both NAFTA and the WTO 
Agreements were not ratified through a process of advice and consent by the 
U.S. Senate, but rather as “congressional-executive” agreements, brought 
into force in the US through simple majority votes of both houses of 
Congress). In this seminal article on the constitutionality of NAFTA, the 
authors question the constitutionality of this method of adopting 
international agreements.  
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manufactured in a United States facility.130 (More recently, he 
has focused on placing tariffs on certain selected products under 
a national security rationale, which would have more targeted, 
and thus limited, implications.131) Whether the president enjoys 
the power to walk the US back from treaty obligations in the 
trade realm is a difficult question.132 To the extent that both 
NAFTA and the WTO agreements were entered into via federal 
statutes and not the usual treaty ratification process, as 
mentioned above, it is especially uncertain as to whether Trump 
has such unilateral powers.133  
It seems likely that Trump was quickly informed that if 
he were to slap tariffs on products coming to the US from 
abroad, without any rationale that would hold up under WTO 
law, the US would soon find itself and its products treated in a 
similar manner.134 Not only would this potentially lead to an 
unraveling of international trade relations and a rapid eruption 
of trade wars, US exporters and US workers would experience 
economic shock.135 Again, while this sounded appealing to some 
during the campaign season, the very idea of imposing large, 
legally unjustified tariffs on imported goods could not be 
sustained. It is worth noting that this particular threat seems to 
have disappeared from Trump’s most recent political discourse. 
Again, the newer rationale seems to be based on a relatively 
                                                          
130 See Mahita Gajanan, Donald Trump Warns of 35% Tariff for Companies 
that Move Abroad, FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/12/04/donald-trump-tariff-company-regulations/. 
131  See Alan Rappeport, US Trade Partners Watch Warily as Trump 
Considers Steel Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/us/politics/trump-steel-tariff.html. 
132 See Matt Ford, How Easily Could Trump Withdraw the US from NAFTA, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/trump-nafta-
withdrawal-order/524463/ (noting the difficulties raised by the fact that 
NAFTA was adopted by the US in the form of a federal statute, leaving it 
unclear whether the President could, without the agreement of Congress, 
withdraw from the agreement).  
133 See id.    
134 See Nick Carey & Ginger Gibson, Trump’s Tough Talk Makes U.S. Firms 
Fear China Retribution, REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-companies-
idUSKBN1412Q7.  
135 See David Nakamura, The Effect of Trump’s Trade Policies? Trade Wars 
with China, Mexico that Could Cost US 4 million Jobs, Report Says, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/09/19/the-effect-of-trumps-trade-policies-trade-wars-with-
china-mexico-that-could-cost-u-s-4-million-jobs-report-
says/?utm_term=.12fe1429893f (writing that Trump’s trade policies could 
overturn many years of rules-based international trade relationships).  
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obscure statute that allows the president to take action to 
reduce imports when national security is at stake.136 
Instead of taking on free trade agreements wholesale, or 
with the intention to rewrite them root and branch, it seems 
that the Trump administration will instead focus on discrete, 
symbolic issues, acting in a somewhat more unilateral fashion, 
but without the broad-brushed audacity promised on the 
campaign trail. For instance, the Trump USTR has moved 
against Canadian lumber and foreign steel, in particular from 
China, but without suggesting that these actions are prelude to 
broader trade wars.137 As of this writing, the situation is fluid 
and uncertain. US trade and political allies appear to be 
working together on trade agreements while excluding the US, 
the effects of which will not be apparent for some time.138 Trump 
occasionally raises the issue of unfair trade and his wish to 
retaliate against countries behaving “unfairly”, but there is little 
consistency with regard to his expressed intentions.139  
Perhaps with an eye to political support in key states like 
Pennsylvania, the Trump administration is investigating 
whether steel imports constitute a threat to “national 
security.”140 It may seem safer to the administration to rely on 
this rarely-used provision of law, under a rationale of national 
security as a basis for imposing tariffs on steel imported from 
                                                          
136 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §§ 201, 231, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1862, 
1864 (2012) (allowing the President to impose import restrictions when such 
restriction is deemed necessary to promote national security).  The Trade 
Expansion Act was passed in 1962 in an effort to stimulate the U.S. economy 
and to prevent “Communist economic penetration.” Id. at § 1801; see also 
Shawn Donnan, Donald Trump Moves Towards Imposing Tariffs on Steel 
Imports, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d8413fe8-
25e6-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16?mhq5j=e2 (noting that Trump’s rationale will 
be a 1962 law that allows for the imposition of tariffs on foreign products 
when the imports in question “threaten American security readiness”).  
137 See Ian Austen & Peter Baker, Lumber Tariff Adds Wrinkle to NAFTA 
Talks with Canada, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/business/trump-trudeau-canada-trade-
lumber-dairy.html (making the point that the U.S. government is now using 
such language as, “NAFTA has not worked as well as it should,” rather than 
the wholesale denunciations that became familiar during the campaign).   
138 See, e.g., Eur. Comm’n Press Release, EU and Japan Reach Agreement in 
Principle on Economic Partnership Agreement (July 6, 2017) (announcing 
that the EU and Japan agreed to enter into a trade partnership). 
139 See Nouriel Roubini, Opinion:  6 Reasons Trump’s Erratic, Destructive 
Policies Could Tank the Markets, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 2, 2017), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/6-reasons-trumps-erratic-destructive-
policies-could-tank-the-markets-2017-02-02. 
140 See Donnan, supra note 136.  
Getting the “Message” on Free Trade: Globalization, Jobs and the World… 
 
 
 
41 
China.141 Although China is not a major supplier of steel to the 
US, this seems to be a kind of trial balloon, launched to show 
some force behind Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric, and to shore up 
support in the Trump heartland.  Although the administration 
made headlines in April 2017 by placing tariffs on Canadian 
lumber, this was in the context of a more conventional anti-
subsidies rationale, which by its nature does not threaten the 
foundation of international trade relations.142 Besides the more 
or less unsurprising nature of the rationale for this action, it 
should also be noted that the US and Canada have argued about 
trade in lumber products for decades. 143  The real question 
outstanding is whether Trump will follow through in taking 
action of a kind designed to more clearly subvert what has been 
the common understanding of global trade rules and 
relationships since World War II, and certainly since 1995.144 
                                                          
141 See Jacob M. Schlesinger & William Mauldin, Trump to Revive 1962 Law 
to Explore New Barriers on Steel Imports, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-to-revive-1962-law-to-explore-new-
barriers-on-steel-imports-1492661339 (describing Trump’s intended reliance 
on the Trade Expansion Act).  
142 See Frances Coppola, President’s Trump’s Tariff on Canadian Softwood 
Lumber Imports Will Hurt America Most, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/04/25/president-trumps-
tariff-on-canadian-softwood-lumber-imports-will-hurt-america-
most/#44034d322232 (assuming the Trump administration’s imposition of a 
20% tariff on Canadian softwood lumber was spurred by complaints from 
American lumber producers, “who have long complained that Canada’s 
system of ‘stumpage’ (charges for logging on Canada’s government-owned 
lands) amounts to an unfair subsidy.”).  
143 See Drew Hasselback, Softwood Lumber Dispute Rears Its Head Again as 
U.S. Prepares to Levy Tariffs, FIN. POST (Apr. 24, 2017), 
http://business.financialpost.com/news/softwood-lumber-dispute-rears-its-
head-again-as-u-s-prepares-to-levy-tariffs-of-up-to-40/wcm/c8743d94-a0fb-
41e2-90ea-e2ac108d4bcf (making clear that the US and Canada have argued 
about trade practices in lumber products for many years). 
144 See Shawn Donnan, Donald Trump Revives Threat to Pull US Out of 
Nafta, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/cfdcec24-87c2-
11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 (reporting Trump stated at recent campaign rally, 
held three years before next election, that he does not believe a deal will be 
reached by officials currently renegotiating NAFTA, and that U.S. will likely 
terminate the agreement).  Republicans in Congress, however, appear to be 
distancing themselves from Trump’s anti-trade position.  See As Legislative 
Deadlines Loom, Trump Creates Rifts with GOP Leaders, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
25, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-attacks-gop-lawmakers-
twitter-creates-rifts-ahead-of-deadlines/ (reporting Congress has twelve 
working days in September to resolve rifts between itself and the President 
that may cause government shutdown).  Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell also questioned Trump’s anti-free trade position, saying “the 
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What will ensue if he does take more radical and unilateral 
action is completely unknown at this time.  
Finally, as of this writing, the current USTR has just held 
public hearings with a view to “modernizing” and renegotiating 
the NAFTA Agreement.145 While the implications of this process 
are potentially profound, it is more likely that there will be 
tweaks to the system, including the removal of a special NAFTA 
panel process to consider disagreements relating to dumping 
and subsidies. In other words, it is likely that the Trump 
administration will attempt to make it easier for the parties to 
the agreement to impose protective measures under an anti-
dumping rationale. While far from “pro-free-trade,” such a 
change is also far from radically nationalistic; importantly, it 
leaves in place the very thing Trump said he and he alone could 
deal with:  the freedom of U.S. companies to move factories to 
Mexico, with consequent loss of American jobs. 146   It seems 
increasingly unlikely that any political regime in the United 
States will deal comprehensively with the interaction of “trade 
and labor,” including of course the apparently inevitable loss of 
American jobs.  Even some of the strongest critics of the free 
trade system and its effects on American jobs support robust 
assistance to displaced workers, as opposed to a return to 
protectionism.147 However, just as public awareness of the free 
trade issue underwent dramatic change over the past two years, 
it is not inconceivable that the global public will make greater 
demands on the world trading system, leading to enhanced 
emphasis on labor rights and job security.148  All we can say for 
                                                                                                                                                
assumption that every free-trade agreement is a loser for America is largely 
untrue.”  See id.  
145 See Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Public Hearings on the 
Renegotiation of NAFTA (June 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/june/public-hearing-nafta-
renegotiation. 
146 See President Trump Tells CEOs He’s Going to Bring Millions of Jobs Back 
to America, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/23/donald-
trump-jobs-america-ceos/. 
147 See Autor, supra note 26, at 2156-59 (observing ability of government 
benefit programs to mitigate negative effects of loss of manufacturing jobs); 
see also David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock:  
Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. 
REV. ECON., 2016, at 205, 229-31 (observing responsiveness of transfer 
payments to import exposure, but also the limited “redistribution of trade 
gains from winners to losers”). 
148 See generally Paulette L. Stenzel, The Pursuit of Equilibrium as the Eagle 
Meets the Condor:  Supporting Sustainable Development Through Fair Trade, 
49 AM. BUS. L.J. 557, 559 (arguing that the public in various countries have 
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sure is that “free trade” and trade agreements will likely remain 
at the center of political debate for a long time to come.  
 
IX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
Many themes in international law and domestic politics 
come together in the Trump “free trade” story. On the one hand, 
writers and commentators on the burgeoning structures of 
global free trade failed to address the severe problem of job loss, 
factory closure and cultural dislocation. The alienation caused at 
least in part through the rigors of contemporary free trade 
agreements is real, and the silence of the “elites” opened them to 
the valid charge that they were indifferent to the economic and 
social suffering of the former manufacturing class.  Even during 
the emotionally charged political season of 2015-2016, 
mainstream politicians and the media did not perceive the 
potency of this issue and the depth of popular resentment ripe 
for manipulation. 
As this article has stressed, there are at least two distinct 
aspects to international free trade:  one is the ostensible—
though often questionable—argument that free trade raises all 
boats, leads to prosperity through exchange of goods, etc; the 
other is that integrated economies lead to more global stability 
and peace. While calling out the modern system of free trade, 
Trump managed to expose a contradiction at the heart of this 
modern paradigm, and yet undercut US leadership to the extent 
that much of this leadership has been trade based.  
More strikingly, the Trump critique, while tapping into 
anger and resentment of the supposedly forgotten working class, 
misidentified the source of distress by blaming foreign 
governments for all American woes, and set himself up as a kind 
of deal-making savior, in a manner that also misrepresents how 
free trade agreements are created and sustained.  He did not 
promise to promote federal laws that would penalize 
corporations engaging in outsourcing. Instead, he presented 
himself as capable of coercing private companies into employing 
more Americans, and, as mentioned above, capable of making 
“better deals”—something that has little to do with the actual 
free trade conundrum.  
It is completely possible that a future US government 
could address the problems of job insecurity and social 
dislocation that have been caused at least in part by global 
                                                                                                                                                
become disillusioned with the operation of what we have known as “free 
trade,” and that more emphasis on fair trade is now required). 
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manufacturing mobility. This would require legislation 
protective of worker rights—making it more difficult for 
corporations to outsource and making it easier for workers to 
find new jobs, especially comparable jobs with benefits and 
reasonable middle-class wages. Blaming China, Germany and 
Mexico, and railing against “bad deals”, is a form of 
demagoguery that will solve nothing. I have argued in this 
Article that failure to act will exacerbate already inflamed 
feelings of resentment and victimization on the part of the 
working class and former working class. However, reacting in 
the wrong way—precipitating trade wars, selectively slapping 
on high tariffs to protect certain industries in a disorganized 
fashion, and whipping up animosity towards friendly 
countries—all of these policies are profoundly dangerous. As of 
this writing, we cannot be sure what the Trump administration 
will do, beyond continuing to inveigh against “bad trade deals.” 
We do not know how the issue of globalization and job loss will 
play out in future political campaigns or voter behavior.  
What is certain is that the failure to foresee the problems 
caused by unfettered free trade, and the inability to make trade 
work for ordinary people, has been a very serious failure, one 
that now threatens the stability of the Western alliance itself. 
With the rise of illiberal, anti-constitutional and corrupt forces 
in a variety of hitherto solidly democratic countries, the issue of 
labor rights and economic stability have presented themselves 
as issues surprisingly easy to manipulate. Academic lawyers 
have again shown a fatal tendency to overlook the social and 
political dimension lurking within legal structures, in this case 
in a very dramatic, even world-changing manner. 
